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Credit rating agencies (CRAs) serve many roles in maintaining properly
functioning debt markets. Their contribution to both Enron-era financial
scandals and the 2008-2010 financial crisis, however, has led to many calls
for credit rating reform. This Essay proposes an incentive compensation
scheme in which CRAs are paid with the debt they rate. If a CRA overrates
debt, then the CRA suffers a financial penalty because the debt the CRA
receives as compensation is less valuable than the cash compensation that
the debt is replacing. We believe that this reform, though imperfect, would
be more likely to generate accurate ratings than other credit rating reform
proposals. We also discuss extensions of our basic debt compensation
proposal that mitigate some of debt compensation's weaknesses, though at
the cost of greater complexity.
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I. Introduction
How does one estimate the probability that a loan will go into default?
This question is critical in the face of the 2008-2010 financial crisis. The
simplest answer may be to "leave it to the market," but there are several
obstacles to this approach. To protect against financial instability,
governments may provide some sort of guarantee to creditors of financial
institutions. To ensure that financial institutions do not exploit this
guarantee, regulators may require financial institutions to hold "safe"
capital, which in turn requires some estimate of the default probabilities of
securities held by financial institutions.' Default probability estimates are
also useful for preventing pension managers and other money managers
from taking excessive risks. Finally, many credit securities have relatively
illiquid markets, making market-oriented estimates of default probabilities
imperfect. This problem grows especially acute in periods of market
failure, such as the stoppage of markets for mortgage-backed securities
and commercial paper in the fall of 2008.
Credit ratings exist to ameliorate many of these deficiencies. Credit
rating agencies (CRAs), such as Standard & Poor's, Moody's, and Fitch, are
paid by loan issuers to estimate the default probability of loans. 2 Issuers
pay for ratings, because a host of government regulations require
investors to hold ratings above a certain threshold; without a rating, the
pool of investors for the loan shrinks. By providing information to
suppliers of capital, ratings also help mitigate asymmetric information
problems that may undermine market functioning. 3 This has created an
enormous market for credit ratings. American CRAs rate over $30 trillion
of debt, 4 and Moody's has had the highest profit margin in the Standard &
Poor's 500 for five consecutive years.5
1 BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL
MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS: A REVISED FRAMEWORK (2004), available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsl07.pdf?noframes=l [hereinafter BASEL II].
2 U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Credit Ratings Agencies-NRSROs,
http://www.sec.gov/answers/nrsro.htm (last visited Nov. 18, 2009) ("A credit rating agency is a
firm that provides its opinion on the creditworthiness of an entity and the financial obligations
(such as bonds, preferred stock, and commercial paper) issued by an entity.").
3 See George G. Triantis & Ronald 1. Daniels, The Role of Debt in Interactive Corporate
Governance, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1073, 1110 (1995).
4 See Jeffrey Manns, Rating Risk After the Subprime Mortgage Crisis: A User Fee Approach
for Rating Agency Accountability, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1011, 1036 (2009).
5 See Hearing on Credit Rating Agencies and the Financial Crisis Before the H. Comm. on
Oversight and Government Reform, 111th Cong. 2 (2008) [hereinafter House CRA Hearing].
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Unfortunately, failures by the three primary bond raters have played
a central role in the 2008-2010 financial crisis. 6 The agencies gave high
ratings to securities through a form of financial alchemy.7 These ratings
facilitated the sale of the securities to institutions seeking relatively high
yields from securities that met or exceeded their minimum rating
qualifications, helping to fuel the housing and credit bubbles by increasing
access to credit. Financial companies, the creators of the securities, held
mortgages and other assets as inventory to form more securities. When the
housing and leveraged buyout bubbles burst, the mortgages underlying the
securities began to default, reducing the value of the highly-rated
securities and of the inventory held by financial companies. These
reductions in value, in turn, reduced the capital cushion of highly-
leveraged financial companies, creating the conditions for the financial
meltdown. 8 Finally, a lack of confidence in the accuracy of ratings
contributed to market failures fueled by information asymmetries.
Without reliable ratings, complicated securities became untouchable at
almost any price.9
Unlike many other organizations implicated in the financial crisis, 10
Standard & Poor's, Moody's, and Fitch continue to exist and occupy the
same role that they did before the crisis."' Rating agencies emerged
6 See Manns, supra note 4, at 1043-47 ("Rating agencies not only appear culpable for
facilitating the crisis but also appear grossly negligent, if not willfully complicit, in papering over
its magnitude and allowing the bubble market to grow even more.") (citation omitted); see also
House CRA Hearing, supra note 5, at 4 (statement of Rep. Waxman, Chairman, H. Comm. on
Oversight and Government Reform) ("The story of the credit rating agencies is a story of a colossal
failure. The credit rating agencies occupy a special place in our financial markets. Millions of
investors rely on them for independent objective assessments. The rating agencies broke this
bond of trust .... ); David Reiss, Subprime Standardization: How Rating Agencies Allow Predatory
Lending to Flourish in the Secondary Mortgage Market, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 985, 989-91 (2006);
Mark Whitehouse, Slices of Risk: How a Formula Ignited Market That Burned Some Big Investors,
WALL ST. 1., Sept. 12, 2005, at Al; Joseph R. Mason & Joshua Rosner, Where Did the Risk Go? How
Misapplied Bond Ratings Cause Mortgage Backed Securities and Collateralized Debt Obligation
Market Disruptions 34-47, May 3, 2007, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1027475.
7 See generally Efraim Benmelech & Jennifer Dlugosz, The Alchemy of CDO Credit Ratings
(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14878, 2009), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w14878 (explaining how financial instrument issuers manipulated
risky assets to achieve preferred credit ratings).
8 See Floyd Norris, The Homes May Be Solid, but the Loans Look Shaky, N.Y. TIMES, June 30,
2007, at C3; Posting of Peter Cohan to BloggingStocks, The $18 Trillion Unpaid Price of Financial
Alchemy, http://www.bloggingstocks.com/2007/08/18/the-18-trillion-unpaid-price-of-flnancial-
alchemy/ (Nov. 18, 2007, 10:05 EST).
9 Cf. George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970) (discussing asymmetric information and market failure).
10 These include Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Bear Sterns, Lehman Brothers, American
International Group, and Washington Mutual.
11 The CEO of Moody's, Raymond MacDaniel, for example, first took office in early 2005
and continues in the position to the present despite the heavy criticism leveled at CRAs in general
and Moody's in particular. See Moody's Corporation, Officers and Directors,
http://ir.moodys.com/managementcfm (last visited Nov. 18, 2009).
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similarly unscathed from the criticism of their ratings that followed high-
profile corporate scandals including Enron and WorldCom.
12
Given the rating agencies' pivotal role in the crisis and seeming
immunity from adverse repercussions, it is no surprise that proposals for
reforming rating agencies abound. Some argue that barriers to entry for
rating agencies should be reduced, allowing competition to improve the
quality of ratings. 13 Others assert that rating agencies should be subject to
liability for ratings mistakes, creating incentives for agencies to minimize
errors. Still others blame the conflict of interest that arises because
agencies are paid by the very debt issuers whose debt they rate. These
conflicts of interest are exacerbated when issuers hire agencies to both
perform ratings and to provide the issuers with consulting services
regarding how to obtain preferred ratings. Instead of this method of
payment, reformers advocate alternative payment systems, such as user
subscriptions, government mandated user fees, or government support.
14
Finally, some advocate the abolition of investor restrictions that depend on
ratings. Instead, the government could provide ratings itself, require
agencies to use market prices to calculate risk, or simply rely on caveat
emptor.
While all of these proposals have merit, each has significant flaws.1 5
This Essay proposes that a rating agency incentive compensation scheme
should be added to the menu of proposed rating agency reforms. The
incentive compensation scheme works as follows. Instead of receiving cash
for their rating of a security, the agencies should receive some of the debt
that they are rating. The debt should not be distributed to the agency at
once, but should be parceled out slowly as the rating agency rerates the
debt until the debt matures. The value of the income streams associated
with the debt the agency receives should be evaluated not at the discount
rate for the debt in question, but rather at the average discount rate
applied to all debt with the same rating and maturity as the debt the
agency receives. This proposal for CRA incentive compensation creates
conditions under which inaccurate ratings hurt the agencies' profitability,
giving them greater incentive to rate accurately. If the agencies overrate a
debt issue, for example, then the cash flows associated with the debt will
12 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: "It's About the Gatekeepers, Stupid," 57
Bus. LAw. 1403, 1408-09 (2002); Carol Ann Frost, Credit Rating Agencies in Capital Markets: A
Review of Research Evidence on Selected Criticisms of the Agencies, 22 J. AccT. AUDITING & FIN. 469,
482 (2007) ("In particular, it was claimed that CRAs' failure to lower Enron's credit rating below
investment grade until only a few days before Enron's bankruptcy proved that they were woefully
lacking in diligence and competence.").
13 See, e.g., Claire A. Hill, Regulating the Rating Agencies, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 43, 85-89
(2004) (advocating this competition-based reform to the credit ratings industry).
14 See, e.g., Manns, supra note 4 (advocating a user fee-based scheme and describing
alternative reform options).
15 See discussion infra Part Ill.
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not be sufficiently discounted. As a result, the agency will get lower cash
flows for a given fee (the fee being the units of debt received in exchange
for rating services), reducing the agency's cash flows compared to what
they would have received under an accurate rating.
Debt compensation constitutes the Essay's core proposal, and offers
the benefit of improved incentives not to overrate without creating
excessive administrative problems. Debt compensation, however, is no
panacea. It may, for example, create incentives to underrate securities.
16
To address this flaw with the debt compensation for CRAs plan (as well as
other flaws), we also consider requiring CRAs to write put and call options
on a predetermined amount of the debt they rate. This extension further
improves CRA incentives, though at the cost of considerable added
complexity.
If underrating becomes a problem, then having the CRAs write call
options on the debt they rate can mitigate underrating. If a CRA underrates
a security, then other market participants, such as other CRAs, might
exercise the call options issued by the primary CRA to buy the debt for the
inaccurately cheap price established by the rating. Thus, the CRA cannot
profit from underrating securities and loses money from overrating
securities. Ratings accuracy should therefore improve because it is in the
financial self-interest of the CRAs to rate accurately. This reform is
particularly promising because it relies on a considerably more direct
accuracy improvement mechanism than other reform proposals.
This Essay proceeds as follows. Part II examines the role of the CRAs
in the financial crisis. Part III discusses existing reform proposals and the
flaws in these proposals. Rather than duplicating other work on these
topics, the Essay instead highlights the elements relevant to the incentive
compensation proposal. Part IV develops the incentive compensation plan
and then examines flaws in the plan. Part V lays out our conclusion.
II. The Function of Rating Agencies
A. Resolving Asymmetric Information Problems in Credit Markets
Without reliable information, credit markets cannot operate
efficiently. When a borrower knows more about its credit quality than a
creditor does, the creditor will fear that the borrower will only agree to a
transaction when the creditor is providing capital too cheaply. As a result,
the creditor will raise the interest rate it charges in order to protect itself
16 Other mechanisms may reduce the problem of underrating. See infra Section V.C.
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against the possibility that the debtor is a "lemon."1 7 But the increase in
price that the creditor seeks will, in turn, cause safe borrowers to refuse to
borrow because they will have to overpay for credit due to their inability
to prove their quality to uninformed creditors. Only high-risk borrowers,
who have little to lose, will agree to borrow at the rate available, which
further raises the premium demanded by creditors. In the extreme, only
very low quality borrowers will borrow, in spite of the fact that many
other transactions would be efficient in the presence of better information.
Prospective loan givers could acquire information about repayment
probabilities themselves, but this would be extremely costly. Indeed, the
benefits of the expensive acquisition of information may be smaller than
the costs of the acquisition, leading to the market failure described above.
Moreover, information about the quality of a corporation's credit costs a
great deal to acquire, but this information can be shared with additional
parties at extremely low marginal cost. One creditor can "free ride" off the
costly information obtained by another creditor, which implies that
information about loan quality will ultimately be under-produced.
There are several solutions to this informational problem. One is to
create an intermediary between loan issuers and loan seekers, such as a
bank.18 Banks often have longstanding relationships with loan seekers,
mitigating the informational asymmetry between capital buyers and
sellers. Moreover, the bank may engage in large credit transactions,
justifying the informational expense in a way that smaller creditors could
not.
The bank solution, however, is costly and incomplete. Banks take a
"cut" of loan proceeds in exchange for their roles as intermediaries. In
addition, individuals with capital face uncertainty when providing capital
to the bank. The asymmetric information problem reappears between the
creditor and the bank/borrower. One way of mitigating this uncertainty is
by allowing bank depositors to withdraw their deposits at will, but this
makes banks unstable, as they then hold short-term assets and long-term
liabilities. The asymmetric information problem also reappears if the bank
tries to sell one of its loans to a less informed party.
CRAs offer an alternative means of reducing asymmetry between
borrowers and creditors. A company pays a CRA to produce an
informational public good relating to the corporation-its credit rating.
17 For seminal articles exploring the possibility of asymmetric information and market
failure, see, for example, Akerlof, supra note 9; Stewart C. Myers & Nicholas S. Majluf, Corporate
Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have Information That Investors Do Not Have, 13 1.
FIN. ECON. 187 (1984) (discussing these phenomena in the context of equity in corporations); and
Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the
Economics of Imperfect Information, 90 Q.J. ECON. 629 (1976) (discussing these phenomena in the
context of loans).
18 See, e.g., Eugene F. Fama, What's Different About Banks?, 15 1. MONETARY ECON. 29
(1985).
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The CRA then makes the rating widely available. The rating benefits the
corporation by mitigating information asymmetries, improving the
corporation's ability to raise capital. If the information provided by the
CRA is sufficient, then corporations and creditors can disintermediate the
bank and transact directly with each other. For example, debtors and
creditors may write minimum required credit ratings into a loan covenant,
thereby reducing the informational burden on creditors to monitor the
debtor to insure it is not adjusting its risk portfolio.
B. Role in the Regulation of Financial Institutions
The above account explains why CRAs might exist without any official
regulatory standing. Their role is significantly enhanced, however, by their
government-granted quasi-official status.19 Because banks, with short-run
assets and long-run liabilities, are inherently unstable, many governments
choose to protect against bank runs through the use of deposit
insurance. 20 The insurance, however, creates moral hazard. Neither banks
nor depositors bear the full risk of failed loans, as the government's
deposit insurance must cover losses in the event of insolvency. To mitigate
the moral hazard problem, regulators require banks to maintain a
minimum amount of capital, which insures that losses are initially borne
by bank shareholders rather than the government or depositors. 21 The
appropriate capital cushion depends on the riskiness of the bank's loan
portfolio. If the bank makes loans to risky borrowers, then it needs a larger
capital cushion for a given loan amount, reflecting the higher probability
that a risky loan will default and the insurance policy will need to be
redeemed.
Without examining every loan made by a bank, however, it is
extremely difficult for regulators to determine the riskiness of a loan.
Instead, regulators rely on credit ratings as a proxy for the risk associated
with a loan. 22 The higher a loan's credit rating, the less capital a bank must
hold relative to the size of the loan. Because capital reserves do not earn
interest, they are expensive and reduce returns on equity. Other things
19 See generally Frank Partnoy, The Paradox of Credit Ratings, in RATINGS, RATING
AGENCIES AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 65 (Richard M. Levich, Giovanni Majnoni & Carmen
Reinhart eds., 2002) (describing the role of CRAs' government-granted, semi-official status in
establishing their credibility).
20 See, e.g., Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and
Liquidity, 91 J. POL. ECON. 401 (1983).
21 See, e.g., BASEL II, supra note 1.
22 Rating Agencies and the Use of Credit Ratings Under the Federal Securities Laws,
Securities Act Release No. 8236, Exchange Act Release No. 47,972, Investment Company Act
Release No. 26,066, 68 Fed. Reg. 35,258, 35,258 (une 12, 2003) [hereinafter Rating Agencies
Release] (stating that the SEC "has relied on credit ratings from market-recognized credible rating
agencies for distinguishing among grades of creditworthiness in various regulations under the
Federal securities laws" since 1975).
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equal, banks prefer to make loans with higher credit ratings because these
loans require less capital and, therefore, lower the banks' opportunity
costs. If ratings are unduly optimistic, banks will hold inadequate capital.
Regulators often apply credit ratings to protect principal as well.
Insurance companies obtain money from beneficiaries and invest this
money in different assets. These companies have an incentive to choose
high-risk, high-yield assets. If these assets succeed, then the companies
enjoy all the profit. If the assets fail, then the losses are shared with the
beneficiaries, who experience lower payouts. To protect beneficiaries,
23
state and federal law often requires insurers to invest in assets with high
credit ratings ("investment grade assets"). 24 This minimizes the risk that
beneficiaries will not be paid. It also further heightens the importance of
credit ratings.
In addition to directly reducing asymmetric information costs for
creditors, debtors thus have regulatory reasons to pay CRAs for ratings.
Without a credit rating, borrowers cannot obtain funds from potential
creditors such as insurance companies or pension funds. 25 Banks will be
more reluctant to lend, because unrated loans entail higher capital
requirements. The regulatory role of credit ratings also heightens the
significance of "investment grade" ratings. A rating of "junk," rather than
investment grade, substantially reduces the pool of creditors available to a
borrower, as the government will not insure against the high default risk
that characterizes "junk."
26
In this environment, it is no surprise that borrowers invariably pay
CRAs to obtain ratings. Ratings reduce asymmetric information problems
23 Again, free rider problems prevent individual beneficiaries from directly monitoring a
company's investment policies.
24 See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 229.10(c)(1)(i)(A) (2009) (requiring Nationally Recognized
Statistical Rating Organization (NRSRO) ratings for issuers submitting filings under the Securities
Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
25 See Rating Agencies Release, supra note 22.
26 The importance of high ratings to institutional investors and banks provides a partial
explanation for the rapid diffusion of "structured finance" products. In structured finance,
investment banks take a pool of assets, any one of which is frequently below investment grade.
Joshua Coval, Jakub Jurek & Erik Stafford, The Economics of Structured Finance, J. ECON. PERSP.,
Winter 2009, at 3, 5-7. They then structure different products from this pool of assets. See, e.g.,
Adam B. Ashcraft & Til Schuermann, Understanding the Securitization of Subprime Mortgage Credit
(Wharton Fin. Insts. Ctr., Paper No. 07-43, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1071189.
Some products start reducing payments whenever one of the underlying assets defaults, while
other products only begin reducing payments when all or almost all of the assets have defaulted.
Coval et al., supra, at 5-7. These latter, senior products were often given investment grade ratings,
in spite of the fact that the underlying assets are below investment grade; the chance of a large
majority of the underlying assets defaulting may be very low, even if the chance of any one
underlying asset defaulting is quite high. Id. The ability to create some investment grade assets
from underlying junk enables structured financial products to expand the pool of potential
creditors. The investment grade ratings, however, depended heavily on misguided assumptions
about the (non)correlation of the values of the underlying assets. Id.
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and expand the available pool of creditors by mitigating regulatory
constraints.
C. The Failure of Credit Ratings to Serve Their Intended Function
The problem with the current system of borrower-financed credit
ratings is that it creates conflicts of interest.27 If there are a number of
CRAs competing for business, then a borrower can "shop around" for the
best rating.28 Competition may thus cause ratings to fail to provide
unbiased estimates of the possibility of default. This problem is
exacerbated when CRAs do not simply provide ratings, but also provide
ratings consultation services. 29 In these consultation services, CRAs report
what borrowers need to do to attain certain ratings. All things equal,
borrowers want to provide the least possible protection to creditors, while
attaining any given rating. Inevitably, consulting therefore degrades the
quality of a given rating, as all firms that pay consulting fees will aim for
minimum protection for the rating, rather than average protection.
This degradation of ratings quality played an important role in the
financial meltdown of 2008-2010.30 Banks holding overrated securities
watched the value of their assets rapidly diminish, and did not hold
adequate capital to protect their solvency. 31 The federal government was
thus forced to recapitalize the banks to prevent the financial system from
freezing due to a lack of capital.32 In addition, lack of confidence in ratings
contributed to the unraveling of several markets, such as the market for
mortgage-backed securities. 33  Once ratings were found to be
untrustworthy, the information asymmetry between the sellers of
mortgage-backed securities and the buyers grew in importance. Buyers
27 See, e.g., TECHNICAL COMM., INT'L ORG. OF SEC. COMM'NS, THE ROLE OF CREDIT RATING
AGENCIES IN STRUCTURED FINANCE MARKETS 15-16, available at
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD263.pdf [hereinafter IOSC REPORT].
28 Roger Lowenstein, Triple-A Failure, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2008, (Magazine), at 36,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/27/magazine/27Credit-t.html ("The banks pay
only if [the rating agency] delivers the desired rating.... If Moody's and a client bank don't see
eye-to-eye, the bank can either tweak the numbers or try its luck with a competitor like S&P, a
process known as ratings shopping." (addressing a statement by former Moody's CEO Tom
McGuire)).
29 See IOSC REPORT, supra note 27, at 15-16.
30 See Triantis & Daniels, supra note 3, at 1110.
31 See, e.g., Big California Bank Fails, Has China Branches, REUTERS, Nov. 7, 2009,
http://www.reuters.com/article/domesticNews/idUSTRE5A60BD20091107 (describing the
closure of one such bank due to insufficient capital reserves).
32 The government was responding to calls to recapitalize banks by Edmund S. Phelps
and others. See, e.g., Edmund S. Phelps. We Need to Recapitalize the Banks, WALL ST. J., Oct. 1, 2008,
at A25.
33 See, e.g., House CRA Hearing, supra note 5, at 167 (statement of Rep. Elijah Cummings,
Member, H. Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform); Julie Creswell & Vikas Bajaj, Bond
Raters in Effort to Repair Credibility, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2008, at C1.
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became unwilling to purchase the securities at almost any price, an
archetypal version of the "lemons problem."
34
Ill. Existing Reform Proposals
The current financial meltdown, along with previous crises, has
spawned a number of reform proposals for CRAs. The goal of the proposals
is simple. By increasing the incentives for CRAs to rate accurately, the
proposals hope to both mitigate asymmetric information problems that
destabilize markets and to improve the quality of regulations that are
based on accurate ratings. This Part briefly examines these proposals. The
goal here is not to comprehensively evaluate the proposals but rather to
place the new proposals developed in Part IV in context.
A. Competition
The three largest CRAs-Standard & Poor's, Moody's and Fitch-have
a combined market share of between 85% and 95%.35 Part of the cause of
this concentration is that rating agencies require official designation as a
Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization (NRSRO) in order for
their ratings to carry regulatory weight.36 The procedures for NRSRO
designation are cumbersome and poorly specified, creating a barrier to
entry.
37
Many argue that lack of competition impedes the quality of credit
ratings. 38 Indeed, in 2006 Congress passed a statute reducing barriers to
NRSRO designation, hoping that an increase in competition would improve
the quality of ratings. 39
34 See Creswell & Bajaj, supra note 33.
35 See, e.g., Hearing on Assessing the Current Oversight and Operations of Credit Rating
Agencies Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of
Alex J. Pollak, Resident Fellow, Am. Enter. Inst), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109 senate-hearings&docid=f:39602.pdf (arguing that increased
competition "will bring in time better customer service, more innovation, more customer
alternatives, greater price competition, and reduced duopoly profits, and indeed better credit
ratings will emerge"); John Hunt, Credit Rating Agencies and the "Worldwide Credit Crisis": The
Limits of Reputation, the Insufficiency of Reform, and a Proposalfor Improvement, 2009 COLUM. BUS.
L. REv. 109.
36 See 17 C.F.R. § 229.10(c)(1)(i)(A); Hunt, supra note 35, at 133.
37 See The Credit Rating Agency Duopoly Relief Act: Hearing on H.R. 2990 Before the H.
Comm. on Financial Servs., 109th Cong. 21 (2005) (statement of Sean Egan, Managing Director,
Egan-Jones Rating Co.) ("[Clurrent regulators are not willing to state what the problems are [with
unapproved NRSRO applications], why the... applications have not been approved or
disapproved, or what even the status of the application is.").
38 See, e.g., Claire A. Hill, Rating Agencies Behaving Badly: The Case of Enron, 35 CONN. L.
REv. 1145, 1152 (2003) ("The obvious place to start [with rating agency reform] is the
government-created (or at least government-strengthened) near-duopoly.").
39 See Hunt, supra note 35, at 133-34.
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The mechanism through which competition is supposed to improve
ratings is unclear. Competition may imply that companies that provide
inaccurate ratings lose husiness, raising the inrentive tO produc accurate
ratings. Competition may, however, also have adverse effects on the
quality of ratings. With multiple agencies, issuers will have greater ability
to shop around for the best rating.40 Moreover, the present lack of
competition creates "rents" for CRAs. These rents are placed at risk by
poor agency performance. If the rents are eliminated by competition,
however, then the CRAs may have less incentive to preserve their
reputations because their reputation cannot earn rents. Instead, the CRAs
may prefer to sacrifice small future profits for larger current gains.
In total, the effect of increased competition on ratings quality is
ambiguous. While competition may improve ratings quality, it is doubtful
that the entry of new CRAs will alone solve the problem of poor ratings.
B. Altered Liability Regimes
At present, CRAs are well insulated against lawsuits by investors in
loans rated by the agencies. 41 A number of critics have argued that the
agencies should be subject to some liability for their ratings.42 The
argument is straightforward. If CRAs are liable for negligent ratings, they
will be less likely to be negligent, and will improve the quality of their
credit ratings.
Placing liability on CRAs undoubtedly increases their incentives to
avoid negligent ratings. Such liability, however, may work too well.
Liability is an extremely blunt instrument for improving ratings quality. A
single negligent rating may cause billions of dollars in losses, causing
instant bankruptcy for an agency. Agency fees, by contrast, tend to be
much smaller. Thus, placing unlimited liability on CRAs may simply
terminate the credit ratings business, with potentially deleterious effects.
Even if agencies do not go out of business, they will become hyper-
cautious; an aggressive rating may lead to bankruptcy while an overly
circumspect rating causes little marginal harm. Underrating may prove as
harmful to healthy market functioning as overrating. Inaccurate ratings of
40 See generally Vasiliki Skreta & Laura Veldkamp, Ratings Shopping and Asset
Complexity: A Theory of Ratings Inflation (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
14761, 2009), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w14761 (claiming that increased debt
complexity and more CRA options may lead to less accurate ratings even without intentional
misrating).
41 See Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets?: Two Thumbs Down for
the Credit Rating Agencies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 619, 710-11 (1999); see also SEC Hearings on Issues
Relating to Credit Rating Agencies, Nov. 21, 2002 (statement of Amy Lancellotta, Senior Counsel,
Investment Company Institute), http://www.sec.gov/news/extra/credrate/investcoinstithtm.
42 See, e.g., FABIAN DITrRICH, THE CREDIT RATING INDUSTRY: COMPETITION AND REGULATION
142-45 (2007); Hill, supra note 13, at 57.
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any sort fail to mitigate the asymmetric information problem. In addition,
underrating means that banks will face excess capital constraints.
Some commentators therefore advocate some form of partial liability
for CRAs. 43 Though this solution limits the possibility of bankruptcy-
inducing liability, it also limits the incentive to avoid negligence. Moreover,
neither unlimited liability nor partial liability improves agency incentives
to provide accurate ratings in the more standard case where the agency is
not negligent. As a result, liability may lead to extensive agency activity to
establish non-negligence, without actually improving the accuracy of most
ratings. This is to say nothing of the reality that the complexity of modern
debt instruments has also made it exceedingly difficult for the government
to effectively oversee CRAs at all.44 This poses a serious problem for
liability-based regulation of rating agencies.
C. Public Funding
Credit ratings have many characteristics of a public good. Ratings
entail high fixed costs of production-researching a debtor is costly and
time-consuming-but zero marginal costs since the information can be
shared costlessly with any potential creditor. Consequently, it is no
surprise that some have proposed various forms of public funding for
ratings. Public funding for ratings mitigates the conflict of interest that
occurs when issuers serve as both the subject of investigation and the
client.
While public funding mitigates conflicts of interest between agencies
and potential creditors, it introduces other problems. Where will the
funding come from? If money comes from the public fisc, then all taxpayers
must pay for a product that directly benefits only a narrow class of
investors. 45 User fees collected from investors are one solution that ties
burdens more tightly to benefits, 46 but determining which investors
(shareholders, bondholders, employees) will pay creates problems of its
own.
Even if the funding problem is solved, the production of credit ratings
grows more complex with public funding. A government agency could
produce ratings, but the government does not have a great history of
keeping abreast of financial innovations-a role that is critical for rating
43 See generally Hunt, supra note 35 (outlining the insufficiency of reform proposals that
do not include at least partial liability); Manns, supra note 4 (advocating rating agency liability).
44 See Manns, supra note 4, at 1027; Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering of Public
Markets: The Rating Agency Paradox, 2002 U. ILL. L. REv. 1, 2-6, 18-20.
45 This argument should not be given undue weight. Nearly all public goods benefit
some more than others.
46 See Manns, supra note 4 (explaining that a user fee system would avoid a full public
subsidy for a small group of relatively wealthy beneficiaries and instead require that the potential
beneficiaries fund the ratings themselves).
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agencies. 47 If public funds are granted to private credit raters, then some
means of regulation must be found to determine who receives funding and
who does not.
Moreover, public funding does not directly create incentives to
produce accurate ratings. Instead of aiming to rate accurately, agencies
will seek to provide the type of ratings that ensure future public funding.
Non-conformist ratings may be squelched, since these ratings are likely to
attract more negative attention for failure than conventional ratings. If
underrating does not jeopardize funding, but overrating does, then public
funding will lead to systematic underrating, with negative consequences.
48
D. Eliminating the Regulatory Role of CRAs
One obvious solution to credit agency conflicts is to limit their role. If
ratings are untrustworthy, they should not be placed at the heart of
banking or insurance regulatory schemes. Instead, many argue that
creditors must take responsibility for their lending decisions rather than
relying on a proxy such as a CRA, or, at a minimum, they must rely on CRAs
considerably less.4 9  If regulators must impose risk-based capital
requirements to protect deposit insurance, then market prices for loans
are much better indicators of risk than are credit ratings.50
This solution has numerous virtues. It limits the potential for
regulatory arbitrage. A generous credit rating does not allow a bank to
obtain higher leverage, because capital requirements are determined by
the price of the loan rather than the loan's rating. Eliminating the
regulatory role of ratings may also improve the accuracy of loan prices.
Without the "crutch" of ratings, lenders must directly research debtors.
Prices will, therefore, reflect educated creditor judgments rather than
supply swings caused by ratings-induced market discontinuities, such as
the "investment grade" requirement. In turn, more accurate pricing will
provide a greater foundation for risk-based capital requirements, as the
market price will provide a best-estimate of the true risk of loan defaults.5 1
Eliminating the regulatory role of CRAs does not imply that agencies
will cease to exist. The agencies will still have a role in providing
47 See Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56 STAN. L. REV.
1 (2003).
48 See infra Section IV.B.
49 See Partnoy, supra note 41, at 704-07; Adam Posen & David Smick, Disenfranchise the
Ratings Agencies, 22 INT'L ECON. 4, 8-9 (2008). The SEC itself has implicitly endorsed this school of
thought in softening requirements that issuers acquire ratings. See References to Ratings of
Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 58,070, 73 Fed.
Reg. 40,088 (July 1, 2008) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 242, 249), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2008/34-58070.pdf.
50 See Partnoy, supra note 41, at 704-07.
51 Id.
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information to combat the "lemons problem" in credit markets described
above. Only the quasi-official status of CRAs in regulating money
management would be curtailed.
Limiting agencies' regulatory role is no panacea. Many loans are not
actively traded, meaning that market prices do not necessarily provide a
reliable gauge of risk. While rating agencies are imperfect, they often
provide more information than illiquid markets do. In addition, credit
ratings are at the heart of the current bank regulatory system.
Dramatically altering this carefully constructed, if imperfect, system
imposes considerable demands on regulatory capacities at a time when
many other aspects of the regulatory system are in flux. Other things equal,
a more limited solution to the problem posed by CRAs is desirable.
The next Part seeks to provide just such a solution by altering CRA
incentives to produce accurate ratings.
IV. Incentive Compensation for Credit Rating Agencies
A. Compensating Credit Rating Agencies with Debt
We propose that regulators adjust the means by which loan issuers
compensate agencies such that the issuer will pay the rating agency with
the debt that the agency is rating. Aside from changing the compensation
structure, the SEC can leave the system by which issuers choose rating
agencies untouched. In the present system, issuers are free to "shop" for
ratings from different agencies. Agencies compete on both price and the
rating terms that they provide. The incentive compensation scheme will
not change the price competition aspect of ratings;5 2 different rating
agencies should bid for business, lowering the cost of ratings for issuers.
The price will be set in the contract between the agency and the issuer to
provide rating services.
While the price will be specified in the contract between the rating
agency and the issuer, the manner in which the price will be paid will be
specified by the SEC. But how should the stream of debt compensation be
valued? To reduce the propensity for raters to overrate, we believe that
they should be valued by using a reference group of loans with similar
terms and ratings.5 3
52 The incentive for agencies to compete to offer better ratings to issuers would be
reduced under the incentive compensation scheme proposal. If regulators were concerned about
the potential insufficiency of the monetary disincentive to overrating, they could impose further
restrictions on the rating process.
53 We necessarily assume here that there will be sufficiently liquid markets for the debt
instruments in the selected reference groups to approximate prices for the compensation debt.
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For example, suppose that credit rating agency R agrees to rate loan
issuer D's debt for a fee of $500. Each unit of the debt D is issuing pays $1
next year. The value of these payments depends on the probability that D
will default as well as the general rate at which investors are willing to
supply capital for repayment next year.5 4 Suppose further that agency R
has many other clients. The credit markets value $1 next year at $0.90 for
clients that agency R has rated AAA. One dollar next year from companies
that have a BBB rating costs only $0.80 in the credit markets, reflecting the
BBB debt's higher probability of default.
D agreed to pay $500 to R. If R gives D a AAA rating, then each unit of
D's debt (paying $1 in one year) is worth $0.90. Therefore, R should
receive 555.56 units of debt ($500/$0.90) as its fee from D if R gives D a
AAA rating. If R gives D a BBB rating, then each unit of D's debt is worth
$0.80. R should receive 625 units of debt ($500/$0.80) as its fee under a
BBB rating.
This fee structure gives R a monetary incentive not to overrate.
Suppose that the true default probability of D's debt is typically associated
with a BBB rating. At present, assume business development incentives
encourage R to give D a AAA rating, as this makes D more likely to choose
ratings from R. With debt compensation in place, however, R will pay a
steep cost for overrating D. If it gives a AAA rating, then R will receive
555.56 units of debt. At market prices, this debt is only worth $444.40
(555.56 x $0.80). In other words, R's fee is effectively reduced below the
agreed price if it overrates a security. To prevent this occurrence, R will
have a strong incentive to rate D as BBB. With this accurate rating, R
receives 625 units of debt, implying that the true value of its fee will be the
agreed upon $500 (625 x $0.80).5s As excessively high ratings will be
priced not at market value but rather at the average market value of all
debt in the given ratings category, R has incentives to ensure that the true
market value of the debt it rates aligns with the average market value of all
the debt in its ratings category. For reasons of self interest, the agency
should provide the most accurate ratings possible.
Because a rating provides information over time rather than at one
moment, it is crucial that rating agency incentives are preserved until a
bond matures. If a rating agency were paid in full at the outset, the agency
would have strong incentives to overrate the debt at its next opportunity
in order to artificially inflate the value of its compensation debt.5 6 Using
the example from above, imagine R is paid with 625 units of BBB debt in
54 See MARK GRINBLATr & SHERIDAN TITMAN, FINANCIAL MARKETS AND CORPORATE STRATEGY
370-421 (2d ed. 2002).
55 Below, we will discuss the possibility that the rating agency bids an amount more
than market price, with the understanding that it will overrate the security.
56 Even if a rating agency is required to hold debt to maturity, it will have an incentive to
overrate the debt in the future in order to attract more business.
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order to satisfy its $500 rating fee. At some point thereafter, this same debt
will need to be rerated. Were R then to disingenuously overrate the debt,
the value of the incentive compensation debt it already holds might go up,
as the market responds to the change in rating.5 7
In order to prevent this, credit raters should be paid incrementally
over time as they rate the debt, ensuring their ratings remain accurate at
every stage of the rating process. At each step, the rating agency's
incentives to artificially inflate the debt's rating in order to increase the
value of its last payment will be counterbalanced by its interest in
receiving the full value of its next compensation installment. As a simple
example of how this would operate, imagine a scenario in which R was
hired to rate D's debt twice over the course of one year. Instead of an
issuer paying R $500 worth of the debt R rated at the time of R's initial
rating, the issuer should pay R $250 worth of debt at the time of the first
rating (Ti) and $250 more at the time of the second rating (T2). If the debt
initially receives a BBB rating (at T1), R would receive 312.5 units of debt
($250/$0.80). In the full payment up-front scenario, R would have
incentives at T2 to inflate the debt rating to AAA in order to increase the
market value of its payment from $500 to $562.50 (625 x $0.90). If the
debt payments are staggered, however, these incentives disappear.
While R would gain $31.25 (312.5 x ($0.90 - $0.80)) with staggered
payments by way of its ratings inflation, it would impose a nearly identical
loss in the value of its second debt payment installment. As the debt would
now be valued with AAA class debt (worth $0.90 per unit), R would only
receive a payment of 277.77 units of debt as its second payment
(250/$0.90). The true value of this T2 payment would only be $222.22
(277.77 x $0.80) and the total value of R's Ti and T2 compensation would
be $503.47. R has artificially and problematically increased its
compensation for overrating debt by 0.6%-an extremely small gain for
the risk of a flawed rating.58 By staggering debt compensation payments,
the gains from intentional, systematic overrating decrease significantly.
B. Intentional Overrating and Underrating
Compensating rating agencies with debt, and staggering
compensation, may still allow for ratings distortions. This compensation
mechanism does not interfere with an issuer's decision of how much to
57 For the remainder of this Part, assume that the market responds to a change in rating
with an increase in market value that perfectly reflects the change in rating. In reality, some
market participants may discern the rating agency's bias, causing the market value to change by
less than it would if the change in ratings were unbiased. The change in market value may be
reduced, but the principle of the example in this Part will remain the same.
58 This small gain could be reduced to zero with a more complicated fee division than
the 50% in T1 and 50% in Tz scenario outlined here.
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pay for a rating, and collusion between debt issuers and raters may still
lead to systematic overrating. Debt compensation also creates incentives
for CRAs to underrate debt offerings.
In a market without collusion, and all other things being equal, an
issuer should prefer to purchase its ratings from the CRA with the lowest
rates.5 9 If, however, an issuer were certain that a CRA would overrate its
debt, it may be willing to pay more for that exaggerated rating. While the
rating agency in a collusion-free market is averse to overrating, it may be
willing to overrate if it can reap compensation with a face value above the
market rate.
As an example of how this might operate, an issuer would normally
refuse a bid that is above the market rate of $500, but if it is confident that
R will overrate its debt, it may be willing to pay an inflated price. If R put in
a bid to rate the debt for $562.50, and the issuer knows that R would rate
its BBB debt as AAA, the issuer would accept. R gives the debt a AAA rating
and is accordingly compensated with debt valued at the standard AAA
market rate, receiving 625 units of debt ($562.50/$0.90). The true value of
this payment would not be R's quoted price, but would instead be $500
(625 x $0.80)-in this case the true market price. R has managed to both
overrate the debt and receive its standard compensation, and the issuer
has received its inflated rating.
The debt issuer's incentives are clear. It need only establish a
relationship with a rating agency it trusts to overrate its debt. In the above
example, while R would have received more units of debt had it given the
debt a BBB rating, this single instance of exceptional compensation would
likely come at the cost of future business with that issuer. In overrating the
debt, they forfeit the above-market compensation they ostensibly quoted,
but an issuer will always choose their bids over similar bids from an
agency that rates debt in good faith. This type of collusion leaves both the
issuer and the rating agency with their desired outcomes, while leaving
ratings systematically exaggerated. Competition and collusion can thereby
lead to overrating despite the compensation debt model-just as it does in
the current cash payment model.
This risk, however, does not mean that the basic debt compensation
structure offers no advantage. While the opportunity for a lucrative long-
term relationship with a debtor may give CRAs an incentive to overrate,
this incentive is counteracted by the short term pain overrating will cause
to the value of the CRA's debt compensation. At present, by contrast,
overrating causes no immediate pecuniary harm to the CRA.
There is also a risk that CRAs will intentionally underrate debt. If R
were to quote the market price of $500 and determine that the debt was
59 One of the benefits of our proposed reform is that it does not interfere with the
integrity of this process.
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AAA grade, it may have incentives to give the debt a BBB rating. With a
BBB rating, R will receive 625 units of debt ($500/$0.80). As the debt is
really worth $0.90 per unit, R will have effectively been paid $562.50 (625
x $0.90), considerably above the market rate. If a CRA was known to
systematically underrate debt, it is unlikely an issuer would accept their
bid, even if it were at market rates. If rating agencies all systematically
underrated debt, though, issuers may have little recourse-and the
accuracy of debt ratings would suffer.
The risks of overrating and underrating described here are partially
offsetting. Collusion between the agency and the issuer is against the
issuer's short-term interest. By overrating the debt in a collusive manner,
the agency is foregoing greater short-term profits that would arise through
underrating or accurately rating. Such a collusive relationship is more
difficult to maintain than a relationship that always suits both parties'
selfish interests. 60 If explicit collusion is illegal, it may be extremely
difficult to maintain implicit collusive overrating. Moreover, a consistent
pattern of paying above-market prices to raters raises red flags, further
complicating the ability to collude.
Similarly, underrating is against the rater's long-term financial
interest. Although the real value of a rating fee goes up if it is underrated,
consistent underrating may destroy the business of a rating agency. Clients
will no longer hire a CRA that consistently underrates. Consequently, the
danger of underrating may prove low. Moreover, underrating causes less
systemic risk to the financial system than overrating. Underrating
inefficiently lowers the profits of financial institutions, while overrating
threatens the stability of financial institutions with insufficient capital.
Underrating is also less likely to cause a "lemons problem" market failure
than overrating.
C. Preventing Intentional Underrating and Overrating
Section IV.B demonstrated that incentives to underrate and overrate
are not eliminated by debt compensation, though they are mitigated.
Because correcting these lingering incentives to misrate is so complicated,
as discussed in this Section, this Essay's primary recommendation is to use
simplified debt compensation as part of a series of reforms to the CRA
process. This Section, however, develops a more complicated incentive
compensation scheme whereby misrating incentives are further reduced
through the use of put and call options. While it is likely that the
complexity induced by this scheme would be more costly than its
60 See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS'N SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS OF
PRODUCT DISTRIBUTION 44 (2006) ("Therein lies the difficulty of maintaining a cartel-the
incentives to defect... are strong.").
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incentive-improving effects, the "put and call" proposal is an example of
how creative use of incentive compensation plans can further reduce the
risk of misrating.
A put option mechanism may help to prevent overrating. 61 A put
option is a contract between the writer of the option and a buyer
stipulating that the buyer may force the writer to purchase a specified
quantity of an asset for a specified "strike price." The application to the
relationship between a CRA and a debt issuer is straightforward. At the
time when the rating agency and issuer agree to the terms of the rating, the
rating agency could also sell (or give) a put option to a third party.62 One
appealing third party would be another rating agency, which would
operate as a check on the agency hired by the issuer. Here, the strike price
of the option would simply be the average market value of debt in the class
at which the debt is rated. If at some later date it becomes clear that the
debt is less valuable than the CRA initially stated, the third party will force
the primary rating agency to purchase some pre-arranged quantity of the
debt at a price that is in keeping with the rating but exceeds the true value
of the debt. This would diminish incentives to overrate and encourage
rating agencies to keep ratings current. 63
Imagine that R gives debt a AAA rating despite its true BBB quality,
and it charges an above-market price to do so. In the example above, R
charged $562.50, when the market price should have been $500-and that
example will suffice here as well. Beyond pledging to rate the debt for
$562.50, though, here R has also written a put option-perhaps for the
quantity of debt it was paid: 625 units. 64 If it ultimately becomes clear that
the debt is BBB quality, and worth only $0.80 per unit, the third party will
exercise their option and force R to purchase the 625 units of debt, and R
will be forced to pay $0.90 per unit, in keeping with the original rating. R
will therefore pay $562.50 (625 x $0.90) for only $500 worth of debt (625
x $0.80). Third parties will only exercise put options in the case of an
overrating, as exercising a put option after an underrating would entail
61 Unlike the previous discussion, this discussion assumes that market participants do
not blindly follow ratings but rather form their own opinions about the quality of debt. This
assumption is likely to be true with respect to other rating agencies, which specialize in forming
their own opinions regarding the quality of debt issuances. Generic market participants, by
contrast, may be less likely to form their own opinions.
62 It is crucial that a (non-issuer) third party has the discretion to exercise the option, as
this eliminates the possibility of collusion that would be present if the CRA sold the put option to
the debt issuer.
63 This is not the same as allowing market prices to replace ratings, which is not feasible
for many bonds, as discussed supra in Section III.A. By establishing a put with a fixed price, the put
option creates limits on the degree of overrating. If the put option is held by another rating agency,
then the other rating agency will be capable of making a rough estimate of the bond's true value,
limiting the potential for overrating.
64 This amount is just one possible example. The greater the quantity, the more severe
the potential disincentives to overrating the debt.
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selling the debt for less than it is worth. While put options thereby offer
some relief from the risk of overrating, another protection is required to
prevent intentional underrating; it is, unsurprisingly, the opposite of a
put-a call option. Forcing the rating agency to sell a call option to a third
party would diminish incentives to underrate.
CRAs can only reap the gains of intentionally underrating debt if they
are permitted to keep it to maturity. Allowing a third party to appropriate
those gains makes it considerably less attractive to seek them through
intentional underrating. If R underrates debt in order to receive more units
of compensation debt than it should, but is forced to sell those units at the
discretion of a third party, R will forgo opportunities to underrate debt. If R
gives AAA debt a BBB rating, and its fee is $500, it gains a surplus of
$62.50.65 If, however, R has also sold a call option at the time of the rating,
a third party can simply force R to sell the debt for the average market
price of debt at R's initial rating. Here, that would require selling the 625
units of compensation debt that are actually worth $562.50 for only
$500-eliminating the surplus R gained from its inaccurate underrating. If
R had intentionally overrated the debt, no third party would exercise its
call option, as this would require the third party to buy the compensation
debt for more than it is worth.
Compensating CRAs with the debt they rate represents a simple step
toward creating rating agency incentives for accurate ratings. Further,
staggering rating agency compensation in line with the debt's rerating
schedule would preserve these benefits. Incentives to underrate and
overrate remain, however, requiring additional incentive realignment. Put
and call options check these overrating and underrating incentives,
respectively. While these reforms are likely no more invasive or disruptive
than many other proposals, they present their own problems and
complications. We address these, and other, issues in the next Section.
D. Complications and Qualifications
Our proposed reform promises to improve ratings by realigning CRA
incentives. This proposal necessarily changes how rating agencies will
behave, and these changes may not always be desirable. First, Standard &
Poor's, Moody's, and Fitch all currently disavow taking any factors other
than default risk into account when they rate assets. As Fitch puts it, its
"credit ratings do not directly address any risk other than credit risk. In
particular, ratings do not deal with the risk of a market value loss ... due to
changes in interest rates ... and other market considerations."66 While
65 See supra Section IV.B.
66 FitchResearch, Fitch Ratings Definitions 2009,
http://www.fitchratings.com/corporate/fltchResources.cfmdetail=1 (last visited Nov. 18, 2009).
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default risk has a great deal of impact on asset value, there are several
other factors that may influence the value of debt. This is salient to this
discussion because if rating agencies are paid with debt, they will
necessarily become concerned with the overall value of debt rather than
simply its default risk.
Standard & Poor's ratings under the current model "are not
indications of the market liquidity of a debt security or its price in the
secondary market."67 Under this reform, though, rating agencies will
necessarily take factors like liquidity into account. A great deal of literature
has shown that an asset's liquidity affects its market price for fairly
straightforward reasons. 68 An asset that enjoys a more liquid market is
more valuable simply because owners have more control over when they
can buy and sell it. This is a particularly attractive feature for limiting
losses when an asset is rapidly declining in value.
The quantity of debt a rating agency is compensated with will be a
function of the average market value of debt at that given rating, and that
market value will partly be a function of the debt's liquidity. If a CRA
anticipates that it will be compensated with debt that it knows is illiquid
relative to the average debt with the same default risk, the CRA may
manipulate its ratings to account for this divergence. This reform, then,
produces ratings that would be qualitatively different from the ratings
currently generated by CRAs.
The impacts of this change could be partially mitigated by altering the
"reference group" that determines the price, and therefore the quantity, of
debt compensation. To this point, the reference group for a given rating
has been all other debt issues that share that rating. Instead, the reference
group could be further limited. For example, the reference group for D's
issuance could be all debt with the same rating that is issued by companies
of similar size with relatively similar maturity. Groups with such
similarities are likely to have further similarities, such as similar liquidity
and sensitivity to changes in interest rates. As a result, differences in value
are likely to be driven by differences in default probabilities rather than
other factors. The appropriate reference group therefore mitigates the
degree to which debt compensation alters rating agency practice.
Second, paying rating agencies with debt and potentially forcing them
to hold the debt to maturity may cause cash flow problems for CRAs. It is,
67 STANDARD & POOR'S, GUIDE TO CREDIT RATING ESSENTIALS 1 (2009),
http://www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/fixedincome/SP-CreditRatingsGuide.pdf. Further,
"[ciredit ratings can also speak to the credit quality of an individual debt issue, such as a corporate
or municipal bond, and the relative likelihood that the issue may default." Id. at 3.
68 See, e.g., Edwin J. Elton et al., Factors Affecting the Valuation of Corporate Bonds, 28 .
BANKING & FIN. 2747, 2756 (2004); Pierre-Olivier Weill, Liquidity Premia in Dynamic Bargaining
Markets, 140 J. ECON. THEORY 66, 66 (2008) ("[Rleturns are related to liquidity, broadly defined as
the ease of buying and selling.").
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of course, less desirable to be paid with less liquid assets than with more
liquid assets. This reform calls for an end to paying rating agencies with a
perfectly liquid asset: cash. It may simply be prohibitively onerous for
rating agencies if they are no longer paid upfront and with cash. This
problem is compounded by the necessity of staggering debt compensation
over time. For the reasons outlined in Section IV.A, the only way to keep
rating agency incentives in line over the course of a continual ratings
process is to pay them in installments as they rerate debt. Thus, rating
agencies are being paid with relatively illiquid assets, and they are not
receiving the full amount of their compensation until they have rerated an
asset for the last time.
69
Third, forcing CRAs to write put and call options on the debt they rate
will further alter the business model of the CRAs. By requiring CRAs to
essentially guarantee their ratings against deviation in either direction,
this reform forces them to bear considerably more risk than they currently
bear. The implications of the inevitable risk aversion that would result are
difficult to predict, but this would, at the very least, represent a significant
change to the status quo.
By simply limiting the amount of options sold, however, this risk
would be severely attenuated. It would, therefore, almost certainly be
necessary to limit them to the total amount charged for the ratings.
Moreover, the amount of risk borne by an agency is directly related to the
accuracy of its ratings. If the agency maintains a relatively accurate debt
rating, the cost of having the put and call options exercised will be
minimal.
V. Conclusion
CRAs serve many purposes. In predicting the likelihood that a loan
will go into default, CRAs facilitate governmental investment protection by
allowing the government to require that relatively "safe" assets are held.
They also potentially limit money managers' capacity to take excessive
risks by making relative asset safety known. Additionally, CRAs generate
information about relative riskiness for assets in illiquid markets where
that information may not otherwise be available. Claims that
determination of relative risk should be left to the market
notwithstanding, CRAs play a pivotal role in reducing information
asymmetries in debt markets.
Yet CRA failures played a notoriously central role in both the Enron-
era financial scandals and the 2008-2010 financial crisis. These failures
inevitably led to calls for CRA reform, and many proposed reforms offer
69 It should be noted, however, that the bonds that may be used to compensate a CRA
will produce a steady cash flow.
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both promising improvements and their own difficulties. Increased
competition among rating agencies may lead to more accurate ratings, but
the mechanism by which this would happen is unclear and increased
competition may, ironically, lead to even less accurate ratings.70 Altered
liability regimes would make misrating less desirable, but a no-liability
regime would actually make agency incentives to provide accurate ratings
more attractive if the agency is not otherwise acting negligently. Liability
regimes craft incentives to encourage CRAs to avoid negligence, not to
encourage CRAs to rate debt accurately.
Public funding is an attractive option if ratings are analogized to more
typical public goods, for which barriers to entry are high and information
can be shared costlessly. Many commentators also point to the current
"issuer pays" model for the perverse incentives that lead to CRA failure.
71
Public funding, however, would not necessarily guarantee more accurate
ratings. The government's capacity to generate accurate ratings is suspect,
and the incentives of public officials charged with rating debt may be more
closely aligned with keeping their mandate than rating accurately.72 As
neither the government nor the private sector promises accurate ratings,
other commentators have argued that the regulatory role of rating
agencies should be eliminated. While the market may suffice for more
liquid debts, however, very little information about the riskiness of a
particular debt instrument would be communicated by an illiquid market.
Compensating rating agencies with debt operates considerably
differently than the other reform proposals mentioned. It requires less
upheaval than the calls for altered liability regimes, public funding, or the
elimination of the CRAs' regulatory role. It is, further, likely to generate
more accurate ratings than those likely to result from greater competition
between CRAs. Compensating CRAs with the debt they rate will encourage
them to rate debt accurately. Requiring them to write put and call options
on their compensation debt will further encourage them to eschew
intentional misrating, though at the cost of greater complexity. While this
reform invites its own complications, it represents a constructive step
toward ensuring that CRAs rate debt accurately. To the extent that more
accurate debt rating will decrease the probability of a similar financial
crisis in the future, this reform has great promise.
70 See Skreta & Veldkamp, supra note 40.
71 See, e.g., IOSC REPORT, supra note 27.
72 See supra Section IlI.C.

